https://www.patreon.com/posts/yer-subconscious-97415673
So, Fuckers, we’re here to keep talking about Filial Obligation; the Philosophy and Morality of.
And let’s talk rationale.
WHY? Why drudge up these bitter thoughts? What’s the purpose of this conversation about the thing we all feel frustratingly out of control of?
Well… a lot of it goes back to the Guilt vs Shame conversation from the end of last year. And the prevalence of unknown, previously, societally-injected narratives that we carry in our SUB-C which drives those emotional events.
We KNOW from prior research that filial obligation is linked to feelings of anxiety, depression, incapacity, helplessness, and entrapment. And this often eventually leads to suicidality.
We realize that engaging with our families in any prolonged or meaningful way is the destruction of our own psyches, and everything spirals out from there.
We’re certain that these people are damaging to be around and always have been.
AND YET.
So many of us find ourselves embroiled in the “do I or don’t I,” “what would a good person do,” and “how do I survive this, now that I HAVE committed” ruminations in our own worlds. We find ourselves being used and abused by the people who’ve always done it, and we still… show up to “do the right thing,” to our own detriment.
In large part, due to the shuilt. The shame and guilt that can burn our self-esteem to the ground.
So. With so many of us trapped behind rocks and hard places, we’re looking to explore: Why is that? Why DO we feel so tormented either way?
And to understand that more deeply, I want to ask “What are the narratives we might be running in the background, justifying or undermining our decisions and better judgments?” What stories and expectations have we collected, consciously or subconsciously, which are impacting our most solid perspectives and decisions (or lack thereof)?
Let’s continue this conversation and find out.
Last time we covered what, I would say, is largely problematic to many of us. The moral-duty-based Eastern view on Filial Piety that seems to strangely crossover into our Western lives when our families start ailing.
We touched on the five rules of FIlial Obligation in Confucism. Support them, obey, honor, and revere them, give them babies, don’t dishonor your family, and be ready to mourn them endlessly when they’re dead.
And several of those points… let’s say, “give us some pause.”
Or “start to question the reality of our own free will from the moment we’re born.”
And, for more troublesome points, we also discussed how it’s common and considered “correct” not to directly ask for help.
Then, we ran through the overarching thoughts behind all of this.
The people who came before you left you with resources that they had no hope of enjoying, themselves. Since they selflessly improved conditions for your life – “dug a deep well for you to drink from” – you owe them.
Which… is questionable.
Furthermore, we were told that the Golden Rule is at play in Filial Piety.
But, with a fun spin.
It’s the child’s duty to treat their aging parents well, so that one day when they have children and fall into old age, that kindness will be karmically delivered back to them via their grown children also treating them well.
Which… encapsulates so much bullshittery, I don’t even know where to begin. But I offer you this interesting point.
Remember the story we opened with? The Chinese woman who sued her children for not caring for her as she aged?
Maybe that woman who needed the state to step in and demand that her boys financially support her in her elderly years didn’t treat HER parents with the utmost respect and honor. And therefore, according to this backwards Golden Rule rationale, she received exactly what she deserved from her own offspring.
Has… has anyone thought of that loophole with this duty- and karma-based approach to interpersonal care?
Anyways, we covered several points that were meant to make you go “ohhh what the fuck.”
Today, we’re switching gears. We’re going to jump back in to this article
The article: Shifting Perspectives: Filial Morality Revisited
Author(s): Chenyang Li
Source: Philosophy East and West, Published by the University of Hawaii, Apr., 1997
But we’ll discuss five alternative philosophies of Filial Obligation from the Western perspective. Some of which, I think we’ll agree with. Some of which, I’m quite positive we’ll collectively be up in arms about, all over again.
All of which, I think you’ll find strangely engrained in your psyche or social understanding, to some degree. Even if you don’t agree with them, I believe you’ll be able to identify lines of thinking that follow suit.
And those are important things to notice, so you have more conscious awareness of the SUBC information and storytelling that might be informing your big decisions OR causing you to endlessly question them.
See what I’m saying?
After that? We’re going to revisit the Confucian perspective one last time, so I can give you the secretly enlightened parts that are woven through. A true, challengingly, reframing experience, if you’re open and up for turning your brain inside out.
And hear me say loudly that “you don’t have to be.” Please, go ahead, be untouched by these views and keep doing what you’re doing. Everyone has to choose their own adventure when it comes to our family endeavors. No situation is the same as another. The most spiritually ascended perspectives do not matter much if you’re dealing with dangerous people or circumstances.
So.
Today, let’s dive in and talk about the Western, variably problematic, outlooks on our obligations to our family members. And I think it’s time that we get started. With, maybe, my favorite perspective of the day.
English’s Friendship Model.
Li tells us:
Jane English is probably the most representative of those Westerners who deny or doubt the existence of filial obligation. In her article “What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents?” she proposes a theory based on the concept of friendship.
According to English, grown children have no more filial obligation toward their parents than the kind of obligation one has toward friends or other people whom one loves.
Accordingly, if parents’ earlier sacrifices for their children have resulted in friendship and love in their children, parents may have the good fortune to be honored and served by their children when the latter have grown; if parents’ earlier sacrifices have failed to produce friendship and love in their children, then the children have no filial obligation to serve and honor their parents.
“After a friendship ends, the duties of friendship end,” she writes.
(Well, if we buy into English’s proposition, we can stop right there and be done with this episode.
Anyone feeling like they have love and friendship as a result of the relationship with their parents? Great, you do the filial obliging.
For the rest of us, Jane English says that we’re off the hook. No relationship to respect and honor, no reason to do all the servitude.
“After a friendship ends, the duties end,” she says. And in our families, there very possibly weren’t positive relationships to end, in the first place. A huge swath of us are No Contact, after giving people the option to work through issues and having them refuse. So, where would any indication of dutiful agreements even be implied?
I mean, Jane English has me fist pumping in the air while yelling “America, Fuck Yeah.”
But, she continues, telling us about the agreements made, instead, through indebted relationships that the vast majority of us are probably more familiar with. If you also don’t feel like your family is your BFF squad, listen up:)
English distinguishes between two kinds of relationships: indebtedness and friendship.
Here “indebtedness” is not limited to literal debts, but is understood broadly to include all situations where a favor has been done.
“Favors create debts,” English writes. If person B has done a favor for person A, then A is indebted to B. A ought to do something to reciprocate the favor.
.(BUT)
She maintains that friendship, unlike indebtedness, is characterized by mutuality rather than reciprocity.
In friendship, a person can benefit from what her friend has done for her out of friendship, but she is not thereby indebted to him. She does not “owe” him anything.
(SO, if we’re friends, we give and receive freely, without expectation, to one another. That sounds idealistic and yet sincere to my best friendship experiences… but highly unrelated to what most of us are facing with this FIlial Obligation discussion.
It’s far more common to have tit for tat, strings-attached, expectation-based interactions with families who think in black and white, control- and domination-based, survival terms. Friendship, unconditional love, and mutuality are not the pillars of a complexly traumatized experience.
So… since we aren’t falling into the “friend” category with these people… According to Jane English, does that mean we’re, instead, indebted to our parents, as the basis of moral filial piety?
Good news. Nope!
Li continues:)
Then why is the typical relationship between children and parents not characterized as “indebtedness”?
Because, English argues, parents’ earlier voluntary sacrifices for their children are not favors to their children, and therefore these sacrifices do not render their children “in-debted” to the parents.
When the children grow up and the parents need help, the children may lend a helping hand out of friendship and love- if the parents’ earlier sacrifices have resulted in friendship and love. There is no filial obligation beyond that.
(Can we get a hell yeah?
Jane English asks…
If someone chooses to take on the duties of being a parent, is that the same as doing favors for those offspring? Do the offspring then “owe” them forever because of the “basic survival favors” they experienced?
Alternatively, if parents didn’t foster a relationship with us that we feel loved and cared within… then why do we owe them any differently?
From MY view on relationships – they need to be an even exchange of supportive energy to work long-term for most of us – I think it’s a great point.
Why SHOULD the “Golden Rule” not be a direct exchange between two individuals? If you don’t treat me how I would like to be treated, why would I treat you the way you would? Whether you list that as mutuality or reciprocity, is this not what we fundamentally call “basic decency” and also “reasonable”?
But, Li is stuck on the indebtedness issued. And to that he says:)
But why are parents’ earlier sacrifices for their children not favors, which should be reciprocated?
English argues that parents’ earlier sacrifices are not favors because their children did not request them. Obviously, the children were too young to request favors from anyone, including their parents. Therefore the children are not obliged to repay them when the parents are in need.
Li asks:)
It may be debatable whether small children make requests. It can be argued that requests do not have to be verbal ones, which infants are certainly incapable of, and that requests can be made through gestures, eye contact, and so forth. Many pet owners think their pets do make re- quests in many ways.
Therefore, in a broad sense of the word, from the mother’s point of view, a crying baby is making a request for help. For the sake of argument, however, let us grant English that small children cannot and do not make requests for their needs.
Now, does it follow from this that parental care is not a favor to their children?
A favor results, according to English, when person A, at person B’s request, bears some burden for B and, consequently, B incurs an obligation to reciprocate. If Max asks Nina, his new neighbor whom he barely knows, whether she will take in his mail while he is gone for a month’s vacation, Nina agrees and does it. If, subsequently, Nina asks Max to do the same for her, then Max has a moral obligation to agree. This is so because, English maintains, Nina has done a favor for Max, and therefore Max owes a favor to Nina.
…Consider what happens when “(Person A) Max simply goes on vacation and, to his surprise, finds upon his return that his neighbor has mowed his grass twice weekly in his absence. This is a voluntary sacrifice rather than a favor, and (Person A) Max has no duty to reciprocate.”
…No favor has been done because, as English indicates, (Person A) Max did not request the service from his neighbor.
But is a request necessary for a favor to take place? I do not think so.
(So, English says “we didn’t ask for your care as infants, you can’t demand our care as adults.”
Li says “nope, care is care, it needs to be returned either way.”
And this is where I disagree with Li. If someone goes out of their way to do nice things for you, that’s wonderful. But in my eyes, nonconsensual expectation of reciprocity for those unrequested niceties is abusive.
If person B only mowed person A’s lawn because they expected person A to do the something for them down the road… that’s NOT a favor. That’s manipulation. That’s “unknown strings attached which cannot even be refused.” It was not agreed upon, and yet, it is being expected, possibly with a side of punishment if that expectation is not met.
To summarize, Li tells us:)
Whether a favor is done has more to do with whether the person being benefited would like the thing done for him or her. In English’s case, imagine that, due to unusual weather, Max’s grass grew much faster than normal during his absence and without his neighbor’s voluntary help Max would have received a substantial fine for breaking a city ordi- nance. Shouldn’t Max consider his neighbor’s voluntary help a favor?
Suppose that Nina’s house is accidentally on fire, and Max happens to pass by and see it. He manages to put out the fire and thereby suffers a financial loss due to missing a business appointment at the time of the fire. Even though she did not request his help, it would be outrageous if Nina does not consider Max’s sacrifice a great favor. It would be in- decent if Nina does not think she has a moral obligation to lend a hand when Max later needs help from her.
Under these circumstances, whether a request has been made is irrelevant to whether a favor has been done. Since English does not deny that a person is morally obligated to return a favor, her
(English’s) entire friendship model depends on the argument that parents’ earlier sacrifices are not favors to their children.
And her argument in turn relies on the claim that a request is a necessary condition for a favor to occur.
This claim is unwarranted, and therefore so is her conclusion that parents’ earlier sacrifices are not favors to their children.
(Says Li.
Well, really, I would say that English’s Friendship Model is more about the historical quality and current state of the relationship. Being a parent doesn’t automatically mean you were a GOOD parent, and therefore it doesn’t automatically mean you deserve shit. And furthermore, we didn’t ask you to be our parent.S
So you know how I feel about this first philosophy – like Jane English is pretty righteous, while also being a bit of a stoney bitch. She’s grounded in the reality of relationships and consent. I love it.
To me, it’s getting to the root of the issue very quickly.
1)) often, our requests were NOT favorably received or responded to
2) what we didn’t directly request, we still didn’t necessarily receive
3) most of us would say that our parental relationships are those of obligation and manipulation – giving in order to get, strings always attached – not unconditional care, mutuality, and friendship
4) hell, probably over half of us wouldn’t say we even have relationships with these people who expect relational rewards from us.
5) I think that ultimately most of us don’t feel like we were granted favors that amount to what we’re now expected to give back, which we never agreed to, anyways.
Is this because we have shitty memory systems that refuse to acknowledge the favors we have received? Are we, like the VulNarcs, encapsulated in negative recollections of the past?
Perhaps.
But is it also possible that we have a lot of complicating factors, such as direct evidence of neglect and unfavorable behaviors sent in our direction… which make us a lot less driven to extend this human characteristic of benevolent mutual support towards people who outrightly throttled us in the past?
That’s my final take on Jane English.
But how do the rest of us think and feel about this?
For now, let’s move along. To another philosophy that, honestly, might make you laugh out loud in the context of being complex trauma informed.
Belliotti’s Contribution to Self Principle.
Here we go, guys. Nongendered. Get ready for the “I’m trauma educated” parts of you to cackle hysterically.
Li tells us:
Against English, Raymond Belliotti argues for filial obligation. He proposes an argument based on personal identity that he characterizes as the “Contribution to Self Principle.”
According to this view, “we have moral requirements of a special sort to those who contribute to and help nurture our identities, and those whose attachment is essential for our self-understanding.”
(Bahahahaha. OKAY.
And again, we can probably stop there, huh?
Those who help nurture our identities and whose attachment is essential to our self-understanding?
UM. Are those our family members?
Probably not. That’s why we’re all here learning about self vs. Self, the many oppositional and repressed parts within us, our weak psychological centers, and our disorganized attachment styles that ruin the rest of our relationships.
So, as a CPTSDr, it’s forthrightly difficult to imagine that we need to “pay back” those delightful contributions to our lives. Zero self-esteem and continual shame over the ways we’re inherently wrong. Thanks fam!
But let’s attenuate the bitterness and continue:)
Belliotti believes that in addition to her failure to recognize unrequested favors, English has assumed an atomistic notion of self.
He criticizes English’s position for ignoring “the way our parents affect directly our very identities, how we have moral requirements to them and in fulfilling these requirements we are, in a literal way, being true to our ‘selves’.”
(That’s selves with a small s, as in, our concept of self. And, around here, we don’t believe that developing and embodying our best, truest, concept of self necessarily comes from our parental figures.
In fact, those relationships more often convince us to abandon ourselves and carry around highly skewed views on who we’re allowed to be.
So, again, the argument isn’t matching up with reality for some portion of the population. But, hey, our author isn’t following along with Belliotti, either.)
Belliotti’s identity thesis bears some similarities to Confucianism, which I will discuss in the second part of this essay. But it is also different from Confucianism in an essential way. In brief, while Confucianism is both backward- and forward-looking-that is, it looks both at what one has become and at what one will or ought to become to determine one’s moral duty.
Li says:
Belliotti’s thesis appears solely backward-looking; it relies solely on what parents have done to shape a person’s identity.
Therefore it is not unfair when Jan Narveson summarizes Belliotti’s principle as follows:
Premise: Person A contributed factor X to the “identity” of another person, B. Conclusion: B morally owes something to A.
One problem with this thesis concerns the negative contribution.
In a person’s life there are countless factors that have directly or indirectly contributed to her identity. If Belliotti’s thesis is to be taken as a one, as it appears to be, it would follow that a person has moral obligations to those who have made whatever contributions, both positive and negative, to her identity.
One should love her father for having taught her to be a good fisherwoman and hate him for the scar he has caused to be left on her arm during a fishing accident.
However, the notion of negative contribution to self and hence negative moral obligation seems inappropriate here because Belliotti is discussing what moral duties grown children have toward their parents, by which he evidently means what good grown children ought to do for their parents.
Perhaps Belliotti’s thesis can be modified to state that we have moral obligations only to those who have contributed something positive to our identities. But then there is the question of what counts as a positive contribution.
(Okay, now we’re talking some sense. Contributions can be healthy or unhealthy, positive or negative. Again, being a parent doesn’t make you a GOOD parent.
Don’t we only “owe” positive actions towards others whose actions have positively affected us?
Or – OH BOY – are we about to get into “be grateful that they taught you to be tough, self-sufficient, and self-aware to a degree that can be crippling via their reactivity and neglect” territory? “It was ultimately for your own good that you were treated so poorly, be thankful!”
…
Actually, no… Li pulls it back and says:)
Suppose someone’s father contributed a great deal to her being a fine fisherwoman, but she hates her profession; should she be grateful for his contribution?
(Ahhh glorious gray tones and beautiful opportunities for “and alsos.” This is why we’re reading so much from Li. I think he sees a spectrum. He then tells us:)
Also, positive contributions may come from different directions. We need not be grateful to all whose actions have resulted in positive contributions to us.
Suppose someone grew up in an orphanage, and a vicious man in the orphanage caused her all kinds of hardship, but as a result she has developed a strong character, which has enabled her to endure future hardships on the way to a highly successful future.
Should she be grateful for the man’s positive contribution to her identity?
(WE DON’T KNOW. THAT’S WHY WE’RE HERE!
And to that end, Li answers: )
Probably not.
So, (he concludes) contributions to our identities alone, even if limited to positive contributions, cannot serve as a foundation for filial morality.
(Wonderful. I think that was a well formed tear-uppance of this strangely assumption-laden argument. And that’s a wrap on examining Belliotti’s assertion that “because they made us who we are on the identify-front, therefore we owe them greatly.”
I think, as Li pointed out, there are so many hiccups within that philosophy that it doesn’t bear too much discussion.
Our families definitely helped to form who we are…
But that’s obviously a disconnective and/or damning point when so many of us suffer from the impact of our families on our selves.
Having poor sense of self, low self-esteem, conflicting and repressed identities due to the influences of our folks doesn’t seem like it merits a lifetime of servitude and reverence. If anything, they’ve made a self identity nearly impossible to hold or honor. And, at best, we’ve learned who we are… by watching their vicious displays that taught us who we are not – we are not them.
Overall, I think we can dispel this un-logic that argues “because we are alive, even if we’re miserably busted in the ego department, therefore, we MUST help the people who developed our mental and behavioral idiosyncrasies, as the miserable selves THEY became, long ago, independent of our contributions, entirely.”
We didn’t create our families. They DID, in large part, create US. And where dutiful gratitude comes into that equation is going to be different for each one of us.
Now the question is, if we AREN’T equipped with a cohesive, clear, and confident self in the wake of our upbringing, for what do we owe them, exactly?
Well… Maybe for all the resources they contributed to us for their own long-term benefit, as is outlined by our next fucky perspective on filial obligation:
Narveson’s Prudent Investor Thesis.
Ohhh Fuckers. Get ready, this one is not less egregious than the last. Here comes the capitalistic take on being a human.
Li tells us:
Jan Narveson favors filial obligations on the part of grown children by arguing that:
(Ahem)
“parents do put themselves to much trouble to benefit their children, and if the children in question agree that the effects of those efforts really have been beneficial, then they should see to it that they are benefited in turn to at least the degree that renders it non-irrational for the parents to have done this.”
(In other words. To prove that our parents weren’t stupid for deciding to be parents, we need to be ideal offspring. Which, loses its steam quickly, since, in fact, many of our parents WERE stupid for deciding to be parents. And we are well aware.
But here’s another way to look at it. ROI.
Li tells us:)
Belliotti (the last guy we heard from) calls this the “prudent investor thesis.””
Narveson believes that one rational motive for people to do good to others (…) is that it is an investment.
According to this conception, people tend to do good to one another “because they see the potential benefits of having everyone so disposed, and if we are to secure such a general disposition, we must instantiate it ourselves.”
(Wow. It’s the “no such thing as absolute philanthropy” argument. “We only do good in order to receive good.”
So, Narveson believes that everyone was better off for the parenting that we received. We benefited because we’re alive. And eventually our parents should benefit from that condition, too.
In fact, he says that they invested in creating and maintaining children, so that there would be later payback.
Rather than taking the ole farmer approach and having children for nearly-immediate free labor, apparently our parents take care of us in myriad ways until we are successful adults so that our eventual labor means they will have a better future.
And, you know… some part of me wants to say “fine.” They put a lot into the development of these beings. These beings would be better off on some universal scale if they put some attention back in the other direction.
The human concept of “fairness” says it’s the human concept of “correctness” thing to do.
Li, with an excellent point, says:)
One difficulty with Narveson’s thesis lies in the clause “if the children in question agree that the effects of those [parental] efforts really have been beneficial.”
Under this condition, a child can easily let herself off the ethical hook by simply denying her parents’ past efforts were beneficial. “Given human proclivities for rationalization and good faith errors of judgment, this is dangerous.”‘
(And this is where we don’t love Li as much as before.)
Although a grown child *should* feel love and friendship toward her parents, and acknowledge that she has benefited from her parents’ earlier sacrifices, even if she does not acknowledge this, she is not thereby exempt from her filial obligation (if there is one).
A person may not feel grateful for her parents giving her a life and bringing her up.
…. But that only shows that she is ungrateful.
The lack of love and friendship on her part does not exempt her from her filial obligation to serve her aged parents.
Morality demands that one fulfill one’s obligation regardless of whether or not one acknowledges it. However, the requirement that the child agrees that her parents’ sacrifices have been beneficial to her does not seem indispensable to Narveson’s thesis.
For he could simply delete the phrase “the children in question agree that” and let the clause read, “if the effects of those efforts really have been beneficial, then….” By doing so, Narveson could easily get himself off Belliotti’s hook.
(SO, according to this argument by Belliotti and further complicated by Li, if our parents did alright (according to others), then we’re indebted to them.
BUT, if we’re left to determine for ourselves if our parents did a good job or not… we will just refuse to acknowledge the good that they’ve done.
The problem is that we aren’t grateful enough. If we have misgivings about filial obligation, it’s because we don’t accept or honor the positive aspects of the parental care we received.
On the other hand, we could get rid of that pesky “did a beneficial job” clause and say that across the board it is beneficial that we are still alive – this is universally a good thing – so therefore, our parents did great. We don’t need to personally feel as though it was a positive experience in order to owe them massively for their investment.
Narveson could have said, simply, “by still breathing as an adult, you are obligated to care for your parents for the inherent good demonstrated in your aliveness shows that they invested positively in the world…”
We might add …. “whether you’re in perpetual suffering and instability or not!”
Yeah, would love to talk to his kids and see what they had to say about dear old dad as a caregiver. Sounds like they might be in our camp.
And I’m not sure that many of us feel that our parents’ time and energy investments were 1) very conscious of later consequences 2) beneficially significant, or, even if they were, that 3) they paid off in generous dividends for which we can split the copious profits with our benefactors.
Anyways, Li goes back to the priorly stated capitalistic approach as he continues: )
There is another problem, however, which in my view is more serious than the first one.
It is the question of whether parents need a rational motivation for having children. Perhaps we can provide a rational justification for having children, but it seems to me that parents do not have to have one.
The desire to have offspring, whether conscious or not, is deeply rooted in every species; otherwise species would cease to exist. In this regard, humans are not different from animals. Regardless of whether we have any rational justification, humans will continue to have offspring. It is a law of nature, and a law of nature does not need a rational justification.
Therefore, Narveson’s notion that a child has a filial obligation toward her parents because she should see that it is not irrational for parents to have children is itself unjustified and perhaps unjustifiable.
(SO, does this idea of “investment” matter?
Li is saying that all animals have offspring, or else there would be no animals.
Therefore… Did our parents set out to have kids – despite all the obvious obstacles and sacrifices they create – in order to intentionally pour resources into us for later harvest?
And he asks “Does it matter if they didn’t?” Or are we all still obliged, for the mere fact that we ARE alive because our parents DID procreate, regardless of their intentions.
Idk, you tell me what you think about this argument. Do animals make babies because animals make babies, and what does that mean about our obligations to each other? Or are we all part of a generational multi-level-marketing scheme, in some parental resource-making investment plan that takes decades to unfold?
I mean… I don’t think most of OUR parents could be seen as intentional, generous, well-planned, benefactors who were carefully investing in their children’s lives… OR playing a “long game” of creating highly effective new adults to give care back to them…
And even if we DID have stellar caregivers, the idea that people are “investing” in creating children, so those children can eventually become profitable, makes it sound like they’re rearing livestock rather than creating tiny human beings. “Invested a lot of expensive grains in this specimen, I expect she’s going to earn me a pretty penny when I take her to market.”
Ah, yes, how we ALL want our parents to think of us. Let us repay them for fattening their little veal calves.
But who knows. Maybe this makes sense to some people. Feel free to shout it out if you’re on board with Narveson’s child-portfolio perspective.
But don’t worry if you’re STILL feeling like there are additional troubling narratives about filial obligation jangling in your brain box to some consciously unannounced level, because we have a few more philosophies to tear at.
And this next one will probably explain a lot of our more cut and dry, traditional, domination-based generational programming around filial obligation.
Sommers’ Conventional Expectation Thesis.
Li tells us:
Christina Sommers proposes a theory of ethical duties that she calls “the thesis of differential pull.”
It is the thesis that “the ethical pull of a moral patient will always partly depend on how the moral patient is related to the moral agent on whom the pull is exerted.”
Based on this thesis, Sommers argues that children have special moral obligations toward their parents because of their special relationship with their parents.
(Already sounds like some bullshit made up by my lineage or any other abuser. “It’s just special between us. It’s just the way things are that you serve me forever, because our connection is different.”)
She attempts to justify this special relationship as follows:
The presumption of a special positive obligation arises for a moral agent when two conditions obtain:
(1) In a given social arrangement (or practice), there is a specific interaction or transaction between moral agent and patient such as promising and being promised, nurturing and being nurtured, befriending and being befriended.
(2) The interaction in that context gives rise to certain conventional expectations (e.g., that a promise will be kept, that a marital partner will be faithful, that a child will respect the parent).
(Ya’ll ready for this?)
Sommers argues that because of the existence of this parental conventional expectation of the children, (…) the children’s failure to perform their expected behavior will cause unwarranted interference with the rights of the parents.
(I’m screaming in my head right now.
So, because the parent-child relationship is not any other kind of relationship, therefore it is “special.” And because the parent has expectations of their children within that “special” relationship… it’s trampling upon the rights of the parents if those expectations are not met.
And that’s it. That’s the whole story.
It’s essentially “because they said so.”
Li continues:)
Although I agree with Sommers on her thesis of “differential pull,” which is similar to the Confucian notion of graded love, I do not think Sommers’ Conventional Expectation Thesis is valid.
By justifying moral obligations on the basis of conventional expectations, Sommer seems to have confused morality with mores.
Simply put, the conventional is not tantamount to the moral. Good performance of conventionally expected behavior is not necessarily moral; and failure to perform such behavior is not necessarily immoral.
(Thank satan, some sanity from our author.
So, I think we all agree that what most people do most often doesn’t mean those behaviors or people are “good.”
Breaking from the common cultural opinion or course of action does not make you “bad.”
Those are completely different things – mores and morals.
Li says:)
Much conventionally expected behavior is actually immoral and should be avoided.
At times in some parts of the world it has been conventionally expected that if a man could not repay his debts, he should give away his wife or daughter to his creditor, or offer himself as a slave to the creditor. Yet this is not a moral practice.
Therefore, one cannot successfully argue for what ought to be the case merely from what is conventionally expected to be the case; one cannot argue for filial obligation by simply stating that it is conventionally expected.
Sommers’ thesis also relies on the concept of rights, which, as I will show next, has an even deeper problem in connection to the notion of filial obligation, and this may undermine her thesis.
(Sigh. That’s it. Let’s kill it there. I’m not sure what else there is to say about this one, y’all. This Sommers character seems to be a troublesome one.
If it all boils down to “well the majority of people do things this way, so those are the non consensual expectations that you must live up to, or else you’re stepping on my RIGHTS….”
I think the world may be doomed. What we need is countercultural views and behaviors to re-right this sinking ship. Doing things the same way they’ve regularly been done clearly has not been working for the vast majority.
But we wouldn’t want to trounce upon the rights of the billionaires by changing the status quo. By working less for them than they expected us to.
You see how these narratives are echoed everywhere? Why they’re so pervasive? Why these lines of thinking become so hard to dispel and replace with objective logic?
Ya’ll we’re trained for abuse, from the top of every system, downward. No wonder we have such a difficult time making the right decision for ourselves.
So let’s move away from that commentary on the “what the actual fuck” machinery that encapsulates modern living. And onto our last possibly-already-subconsciously-engrained view on filial obligation.
But I think you might like it.
Personal freedom of choice and autonomy (two human needs), here we come!
Blustein’s Gratitude Theory.
Jeffrey Blustein’s thesis is that grown children owe their parents many things… and yet are not indebted to them.
He distinguishes between two kinds of duties: duties of gratitude and duties of indebtedness.
Duties of gratitude are owed only to those who have helped or benefited us freely, without thought of personal gain, simply out of a desire to protect or promote our well-being….
Duties of indebtedness, in contrast, can be owed to those who were motivated primarily by self-interest or by the desire to help only insofar as this was believed to involve no risk or loss to themselves.
A person with duties of indebtedness is subject to claims for repayment, while a person with duties of gratitude is not.
(So, Blustein says that if we were given things without expectation of return – just for the purity of the action and their love for us… then we fall into the duties of gratitude category.
But we aren’t “obligated” to repay those kindnesses, because they were given without anticipation of receiving anything back. We can mutually return those favors, but it is not required.
However, if we were given things with an agreement or expectation that they would be repaid, then we are in the vein of duties of indebtedness. These ARE due back to the original issuer of care. We ARE obligated.
If we WERE purposely invested in, like Narveson claimed, then Blustein is supporting the idea that we must return those investments.
So here’s where it comes back down to earth:)
Li says:
Grown children’s duties to their parents are typically duties of gratitude. With such duties, grown children ought “to express their gratitude in words or deeds or both,” but the parents do not have claims for repayment from their children.
(So, let’s say, “it would be wonderful if people who feel genuine gratitude to their parents for their parenting efforts returned the favor in words, deeds, or both.”
I’m on board with that.
Of course, to his other point, I don’t agree that if parents were raising you with the idea that they were investing in an eventual repayment plan, you are obliged to fulfill that plan. Narveson and Bluestein can lick my butt, I don’t believe in the concept of “farming human capital.”
But buckle up, because this philosophy of Blustein seems to present… is about to take a philosophical turn that will make you pause. And then possibly find much deeper agreement with this view.
Hang with me, it’s going to get weird for a minute, and then you’ll possibly also be nodding with fervor.
Li tells us:)
Blustein suggests that the occurrence of duties of indebtedness requires two conditions.
First, the giver does not have a duty to benefit the receiver; second, the receiver not only receives, but also accepts, the benefit.
(So first it has to be a pure act of kindness, and the pure act of kindness has to be accepted, in order for retributory duties to be born.)
In order for claims to repayment to have any moral force, Blustein writes, “it must first be established that what parents claim repayment for is something that they were morally at liberty to give to or withhold from their children.”
But a lot of things that parents do for their children are things required by their parental duty and demanded by the children’s rights. “Children’s claim rights,” says Blustein, “correlate with the obligations of their parents.”
(therefore) Mere fulfillment of duties does not create indebtedness.
(So, he’s saying that the first condition of filial reciprocity isn’t being met.
The giver IS REQUIRED to give the care, so therefore the care does not spawn repayment duties.
And he says that the SECOND condition isn’t being met, either, because… well, remember our argument back when we discussed Jane English’s model of Friendship? You cannot FORCE supposed “favors” on others and then demand rewards?
Li says:)
Moreover, Blustein maintains that one cannot become indebted if one does not accept the benefit that one receives.
If you, under no obligation, offer to maintain my lawn while I go on vacation and I accept your offer and benefit from the service, then I am indebted to you. But if I refuse your offer, then you cannot make me indebted to you by maintaining my lawn. In the latter case, I only receive, but do not accept, the benefit.
Blustein argues that, within the family, the parents do have a duty to provide care for their young children, and the children, while young, “cannot exercise genuine choice with respect to the benefits of early care.'”
Therefore, unless the parents have done something good for their children that is not required by parental duty, and the children accept it (or would have accepted if they could exercise genuine choice), the children will not have duties of indebtedness to their parents.
(ANd this is where I think we reach the crux of the parental care conversation for me, myself.
Bluestein is saying, whatever parents “give” to their children? Often isn’t a choice for either of them. The parents HAVE to care for their kids, legally. And their kids can’t CONSCIOUSLY CONSENT to receiving this care.
It’s not the choice of the child to be in a position of requiring help from the adults. Meanwhile, short of giving them up for adoption, it’s legally not the choice of the parent to care for the child. And the child isn’t capable of comprehending or turning away the help that is required to give them.
So therefore, only what is being “required” is being performed. And therefore, therefore, no debt is accrued.
Li tells us:)
One objection to Blustein might be that parental duty cannot be clearly defined.
If a couple does more for their children than average parents, and if their children appreciate it, would that entitle the parents to some claims over the children for repayment?
(Entitle them? I say no. But I do think we might be talking about a case where “it seems like the responsive thing to do.”)
However, this objection may be trivial. For Blustein can say that the main issue here concerns the large portion of parental sacrifices clearly required by parental duty; if parents cannot claim repayment for these services required by parental duty, then there is no basis for demanding that the children reciprocate for these services.
(AKA – it’s not those tiny blips of “over and beyond” parenting that count. It’s the bulk of the parenting. And the bulk of the parenting is state-mandated.
He says:)
One cannot deny that parents do have a duty to care for their children.
If fulfillment of duties does not create indebtedness, then it follows that children are not indebted by benefiting from the parents’ service, which is required by parental duty. If this is the case, Blustein’s goal is achieved.
(Whew. Alright.
Blustein says we repay people who we feel gratitude towards, because we want to.
Meanwhile we repay people we feel dutifully required to because they’ve put so much extra effort into us that it must be unquestionably returned.
The argument being… What is parental care and kindness? What counts as “extra effort”? Versus, what is plain ole parental requirement?
And does it matter?
As we’ve been asking through several of these arguments, I think the major point has often come down to the question: if the people who raised us were legally bound to do so… and they made the choice to do so… then what do WE owe them?
And on that note, let’s wrap this episode.
WRAP
We covered a lot today. I know it could be tempting to listen passively to these theories without fully engaging, but I want to encourage everyone who has Filial Obligation in their future (as a giver or receiver) to work through each of them and decide what you do and don’t agree with.
Jane English – the Friendship Model
Raymond Bellioti – the Contribution to Self Principle
Jan Narveson – the Prudent Investor Thesis
Christina Sommers – the Conventional Expectation Thesis
Jeff Bluestein – the Gratitude Theory
Figure out what semi-logical judgments and narratives you might be carrying around, due to nature or nurture, which might fall in line with these five western theories. Then, you might find it easier to untangle the inner arguments you’ve possibly been hosting around Filial Obligation.
Do we care for others because they’ve cared for us?
Because they’ve formed the product that we’ve become?
Because they unwisely had children in the first place?
Because those children were expensive for them?
Because it’s what’s “expected”?
Or because of genuine gratitude and mutual love?
That’s for all of us to decide, ourselves.
But never forget, based on the number of impassioned arguments we heard today… which, I believe, live inside all of us to some subconscious extent… clearly there isn’t a “correct” answer. Even within the same “westernized view.”
No one can even agree on what “accepting care” means.
Or where parental duty becomes kindness rather than legal requirement.
So, clearly, no one can ever know what you’re “indebted” for. Nor can anyone begin to understand your social and materially invested circumstances – historical or present.
…. Including how deeply immersed in anxiety, depression, entrapment, loss of self, and suicidality you become when you’re around your genomic benefactors. Which, ultimately, I believe, needs to trump any of these philosophical takes on universal law.
Or, at least that’s my take on this discussion (so far) of Filial Duty, Morality, and Responsibility.
But… Li has a lot more to say. Like, how filial obligation isn’t so much a repayment as an investment opportunity FOR US.
Are you ready to hear his take on filial obligation, again, from his confucian perspective? This time, with a very different view than before?
Just like these five popular subconscious narratives… next time we speak let’s give this spiritual insight some vocabulary.
Reject it as you will. Accept it, if it hits you the right way.
Y’all can let me know.
And I’ll see you next time as we dig into the perspective-expanding portion of the Confucian view.
Til then?
Remember the five philosophies as you sort out your filial thoughts.
Jane English – the Friendship Model
Raymond Bellioti – the Contribution to Self Principle
Jan Narveson – the Prudent Investor Thesis
Christina Sommers – the Conventional Expectation Thesis
Jeff Bluestein – the Gratitude Theory
And if your head starts a ruminatory overanalysis cycle of “what’s the right thing to do for this decrepit jackass,” center yourself into the logic that we ran through here, pulling out the most grounded portions of each one and spitting out the normalized abuse that remains. And keeping in mind that these are common strings in the human consciousness, whether they’re ultimately logical or absolutely based on conventional cultural abuse. Sommers.
Or, at least, that’s my hope.
Hail yourself. The one you should be so grateful to your parents for helping you to develop.
I kid.
Hail your choice. Hail doing what’s best for you. Hail the end of conventional morality.
Hail Archie and Marcus Barks.
And cheers y’all.